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JUDGING “UNDER FIRE” AND THE RETREAT TO FACTS
ALLISON ORR LARSEN*
ABSTRACT
Americans tend to worry about how our current polarized political
climate will affect the legitimacy of our courts. Often overlooked in
this important conversation is a discussion about what a toxic po-
litical dialogue can do—and in fact is doing—to the construction of
the law itself. This Article will begin to make the case that judicial
decisions themselves change as a result of high-intensity politics.
Specifically, I will argue that when judges are “under fire” (to borrow
a phrase from Planned Parenthood v. Casey), they tend to cloak their
decisions in factual observations about the world that seem neutral
and objective, even if that neutrality is an illusion.
To build my case, I draw lessons from a comparison with judges
in a sister country also plagued with an epic political gridlock—the
United Kingdom. I will make several observations stemming from
this comparison, and then I will tie them together in a plausible ex-
planatory story. I claim that (1) American law is anchored in factual
claims about the way the world works that is very different from
judicial decisions in the United Kingdom; (2) U.K. judges have long
been protected from public accusations of acting “political” in a way
American judges have not; and (3) these two observations are related.
An important consequence of a culture that throws political mud
on judges, therefore, is that judges will shield themselves from it by
anchoring their decisions in “neutral” claims of fact. Thus, the Voting
Rights Act is dismantled because of factual evidence (laid out in
* Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I am very grateful to the William &
Mary Law Review members for hosting an excellent symposium and for inviting me to select
the topic and participants. I also would like to thank the fabulous symposium authors and
contributors for the help they provided me in thinking about these issues and Helen Brewer
and Meagan Flora for their excellent research assistance.
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graphs and charts) that voting patterns have changed over time.
Campaign spending is protected by the First Amendment because
there is no factual “evidence on the record” that it causes corruption.
Even older cases penned when the Justices knew the nation was
watching critically (Roe v. Wade and Brown v. Board of Education)
rest their rationales on factual claims about the way the world
works. Put simply, American judges are using facts as shields from
accusations that they are behaving politically, and there is every
reason to believe this trend will increase as the need to protect
themselves continues.
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INTRODUCTION
Two countries with a shared heritage find themselves in epic
political moments at the exact same time. In 2016, both the United
Kingdom and the United States held momentous elections (voting
to leave the European Union and to elect President Donald Trump,
respectively).1 Each decision left citizens bitterly divided along
battle lines so interwoven with questions of national identity that
people seem to be forever entrenched and hopelessly partisan.2
Judges in both countries have been pulled into the political mud.
In the United Kingdom, a Supreme Court decision that any exit
from the European Union must go through Parliament was met
with cries that the courts were stealing the Brexit decision from the
people.3 In the United States, after a bitter confirmation battle that
only united the country in feeling divided, President Trump and
Chief Justice John Roberts publicly traded barbs over the independ-
ence of what the President dubbed “Obama judges.”4
There are important differences between the way judges are
viewed in the United Kingdom and the way they are viewed in the
United States. Reflecting on those distinct norms leads to impor-
tant insights. Consider the fact that following the judicial-Brexit
backlash came a subsequent reaction in the United Kingdom—a
concern that criticizing judges was out of bounds and dangerous for
1. James M. Lindsay, Ten Most Significant World Events in 2016, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/blog/ten-most-significant-world-events-2016 [https://
perma.cc/EK3S-CU8E].
2. See Anushka Asthana et al., UK Votes to Leave EU After Dramatic Night Divides
Nation, GUARDIAN (June 24, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/
24/britain-votes-for-brexit-eu-referendum-david-cameron [https://perma.cc/BEW7-33NX];
Patrick Healy & Jeremy W. Peters, Donald Trump’s Victory Is Met with Shock Across a Wide
Political Divide, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes/2016/11/10/us/politics/donald-
trump-election-reaction.html [https://perma.cc/7GR9-FSK7].
3. See, e.g., Brexit Court Case: Who Is Gina Miller?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017), https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37861888 [https://perma.cc/J6JR-KU88] (“The Daily Mail
branded the judges ‘Enemies of the people’, while the Daily Express said the ruling had
marked ‘the day democracy died’.”).
4. Elizabeth Zwirz, Trump Slams Chief Justice Roberts, Insists There Are ‘Obama
Judges,’ FOX NEWS (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-slams-chief-
justice-roberts-insists-there-are-obama-judges [https://perma.cc/RW87-MCFQ].
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the rule of law.5 Viral tweets from Britons indicated a sense of
outrage but not the sort of outrage an American would expect:6
• “This is getting completely out of hand. If The Daily Mail
speaks of Judges as enemies of the people, democracy is being
undermined. Shame!”;7
• “Today’s a bad day for the constitution[.] Not because of
#Brexit case but attacks on independent judiciary & rule of
law”;8
• “Ignore anti-judge venom in tomorrow’s press, and give
thanks for an independent judiciary upholding the principles
of our democracy[.]”9
The notion that the judiciary must be protected from “anti-judge
venom” likely seems very foreign to Americans. We are quite accus-
tomed to seeing judges criticized in the news.10 Leaders from both
political parties take their fair number of shots at judges who issue
decisions with which they disagree.11 It is indeed quite common to
5. Christopher Clement-Davies, “The Judges Versus the People?”: Brexit, Populism and
the Rule of Law, 2016 INT’L ENERGY L. REV. 279, 280 (“The press onslaught .... amounted to
a reckless or cynical attack on two of the most fundamental pillars of a free society, the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and the rule of law.”).
6. The tweets followed the decision by the High Court of England and Wales in R (Miller)
v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC (Admin) 2768 (Eng.). That
decision was subsequently affirmed by the U.K. Supreme Court. R (Miller) v. Secretary of
State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 (appeal taken from Eng.). The tweets
were collected in an article by Claire Phipps. Claire Phipps, British Newspapers React to
Judges’ Brexit Ruling: ‘Enemies of the People,’ GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.the
guardian.com/politics/2016/nov/04/enemies-of-the-people-british-newspapers-react-judges-
brexit-ruling [https://perma.cc/AFH6-VR9N].
7. Nigel Pascoe QC (@nigel_pascoe), TWITTER (Nov. 3, 2016, 3:47 PM), https://twitter.
com/nigel_pascoe/status/794310001754066946 [https://perma.cc/WX7P-NZNS].
8. The CBA (@TheCriminalBar), TWITTER (Nov. 3, 2016, 5:28 PM), https://twitter.com/
TheCriminalBar/status/794335421522132993 [https://perma.cc/DVK6-6RVQ].
9. Mary Riddell (@MaryRiddell), TWITTER (Nov. 3, 2016, 3:59 PM), https://twitter.com/
MaryRiddell/status/794313100187041792 [https://perma.cc/ZB22-ZCB8].
10. See Alicia Bannon & Daniel I. Weiner, How to Criticize a Judge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Mar. 6, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/civil-wars/articles/2017-03-06/
donald-trumps-revised-travel-ban-may-reignite-attacks-on-federal-judges [https://perma.cc/
278J-29NX].
11. See id.; see also Will Soltero, REACTION: Democrat, Republican Leaders Criticize
Supreme Court for Partisan Gerrymandering Ruling, COMMON CAUSE (June 28, 2019), https://
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see American academics and journalists referring to the Justices “as
politicians in robes”12 and poking fun at the notion that the jurists
are distinct in any way from their ideology.13 Even the President of
the United States is not shy to express displeasure with what he
calls “ridiculous” decisions of “so-called judge[s].”14
President Trump’s language may sound extreme, but the senti-
ment behind it is not new. Indeed, in the United States, “[j]udicial
rulings are criticized all the time, and by all manner of people.”15 As
commentators from the Brennan Center put it, “Judges aren’t
immune from pointed criticism. Like it or not, they are part of our
political system.”16 Judges in America are, perhaps now more than
ever, “under fire.”17
The goal of this Article—and indeed the theme of this sympo-
sium—is to think critically about what it means to decide a case
“under fire” (a phrase I borrow from the Supreme Court in Casey as
it discussed the importance of stare decisis when judging under
pressure).18 My analytic tool is a comparative lens. Because our
cousins across the pond find themselves in a similar divided political
www.commoncause.org/democracy-wire/reaction-democrat-republican-leaders-come-out-
against-supreme-court-for-partisan-gerrymandering-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/Y986-UH2Q].
12. Michael B. Hyman, An Impartial Judiciary, If We Are Willing to Keep It, 24 CBA REC.,
June/July 2010, at 6, 6.
13. Ronald L. Trowbridge, One Supreme Court Justice Can Run the Whole Country, HILL
(June 28, 2019, 5:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/450951-one-supreme-court-
justice-can-run-the-whole-country [https://perma.cc/45JF-BVU2] (“Constitutional scholar
Jeffrey Toobin has observed: ‘When it comes to the core of the Court’s work, determining the
contemporary meaning of the Constitution, it is ideology, not craft or skill, that controls the
outcome of cases.... When it comes to the incendiary political issues that end up in the
Supreme Court, what matters is not the quality of the arguments but the identity of the
justices.’ What separates justices ‘is judicial philosophy—ideology—and that means every-
thing on the Supreme Court.’ Five people.”).
14. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827867311054974976 [https://perma.cc/N35G-22JZ] (“The
opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our coun-
try, is ridiculous and will be overturned!”); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Power of ‘So-Called
Judges,’ 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 14, 15 n.5 (2018) (quoting id.). 
15. Bannon & Weiner, supra note 10.
16. Id.
17. I borrow this phrase from the Supreme Court’s explanation for reaffirming Roe v.
Wade. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (“[T]o overrule under fire in the
absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the
Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question.”) (upholding Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
18. See id.
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moment, but the norms of judicial criticism are quite different, it is
helpful to use the comparison to explore these issues. I recognize, of
course, that the variations between the two legal systems are great,
and in many ways, I am not making an apples-to-apples compari-
son, although recent events indicate greater parallels between the
two systems than existed before.19 Nonetheless, sometimes it takes
a comparative perspective to reveal important facets of one’s own
legal system. In the words of H.L.A. Hart, “[T]here are important
aspects of even very large mountains which cannot be seen by those
who live on them but can be caught easily by a single glance from
afar.”20
In that spirit, I offer the following three observations in this Arti-
cle: (1) American law is infused with factual observations about the
way the world works in a way that is very different from decisions
made by judges in the United Kingdom; (2) U.K. judges have long
been protected from public accusations of being “political” in a way
that American judges have not; and (3) these two dynamics are
related. The implication of these three observations is to suggest one
explanation—though certainly not the only story—as to why U.S.
law is “facty” in a way that is somewhat unique around the globe.
(“Facty” is a word I coined and that I will definitely try again to
make mainstream.)21
19. In her wonderfully helpful article Professor Erin Delaney explains that recent develop-
ments in the United Kingdom—specifically the passage of the Human Rights Act in 1998; the
newly empowered legislatures in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales; and the creation of
the United Kingdom Supreme Court in 2005—have created something of a “constitutional re-
naissance” and a “judiciary rising” in the United Kingdom. Erin F. Delaney, Judicary Rising:
Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom, 108 NW. L. REV. 543, 544, 547 (2014). Thus,
although historically the United States and United Kingdom have had radically different
conceptions of judicial power (owing in large part to notions of parliamentary sovereignty and
political constitutionalism in the United Kingdom), the past twenty years have seen “an in-
creased, and increasing, power of the judiciary” across the pond, leading many to claim that
a constitutional shift is occurring in Britain and parallels to the United States are on the rise.
Id. at 548.
20. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the
Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 969 (1977).
21. “On the spectrum between law and fact, ‘facty’ describes the area on the fact side of
the scale—meaning, as described below, claims that can be falsified and are supported by
secondary authorities.” Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of Alternative Facts,
93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 175, 182 & n.27 (2018) [hereinafter Larsen, Constitutional Law]; see also
Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1775 (2014)
[hereinafter Larsen, Amicus Facts].
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Using four examples from across time and subject matter, I argue
that U.S. judges (unlike their British brethren) feature facts in their
decisions in part as a defensive move to shield themselves from
political backlash. Thus, Justice Harry Blackmun—who famously
spent a summer researching abortion procedures and then wrote
Roe v. Wade steeped in those facty observations—kept newspaper
clippings with Gallup poll numbers in the case file and made notes
each time the Court was criticized on the abortion issue.22 Or Justice
Anthony Kennedy wrote Citizens United v. FEC in empirical
terms—using facty language to discuss the evidence (or lack of
evidence) of corruption caused by campaign spending—against the
backdrop of sustained criticism and accusations of judicial activism
lodged at the Court.23 Roe and Citizens United are, I submit, high-
profile examples of the Justices using “facty shields” in their ratio-
nales while deciding a case “under fire.”
Why would judges do this? Why retreat to facts when afraid of
backlash? Are our judges really so thin-skinned? I fully admit that
answering those questions involves a healthy dose of speculation
into what motivates judges, which is always a dubious enterprise.
But this is where the comparison to the United Kingdom gives im-
portant perspective and payoff. Remember that the general mud-
slinging over judges in the United States (the “anti-judging venom”
that the United Kingdom tries to avoid) is a particular form of
criticism: the accusation is that judges are acting politically rather
22. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME
COURT JOURNEY 90-91, 134, 182-84 (2005); Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and
After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2301 & n.11 (2011);
Issac Unah et al., U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Public Mood, 30 J.L. & POL. 293, 332-36
(2015).
23. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV.
581, 583 (2011) (“In this regard, consider the [Citizens United] Court’s declaration as an
empirical matter—apparently for all types of elections and all types of spenders—that
‘independent expenditures ... do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.’”
(quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010))); Pamela S. Karlan, Answering
Questions, Questioning Answers, and the Roles of Empiricism in the Law of Democracy, 65
STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1280-81 (2013) (“[The Citizens United] explanation in one sense sounds
empirical: ‘The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate
to lose faith in our democracy’.... Those statements in Citizens United are phrased as
statements of fact, or predictions. But as I have explained elsewhere, ‘the Court’s decision in
Citizens United reflected a philosophical, rather than an empirical, position on money’s effect
on politics.’” (citations omitted)).
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than judicially.24 The old accusation of “legislating from the bench”
looms large in the United States.25 In this environment and in the
face of such criticism, there is something very comforting about a
retreat to facts. Rather than directly announcing philosophical or
normative commitments, the judge or Justice is just announcing the
facts in a “neutral” way. Applying general principles to facts is, after
all, in the core of the judicial role.26 The allure of factiness, there-
fore, is that the Justices are merely calling things like they see
them. This “just the facts, ma’am” strategy is attractive because it
appears judicially modest ... even if it is not.
A few important disclaimers are needed in order to establish the
scope of this Article. Although I have chosen high-profile examples,
I do not mean to imply that it is only in those cases where U.S. law
is fattened with factual authorities. Indeed, as I have said before, I
think the facty turn in the United States incorporates far more than
just the marquee end-of-June cases (although I do think the end-of-
June cases are particularly prone to the facts-as-shield dynamic).
Nor do I think this is an entirely new phenomenon as my examples
indicate. Further, I also concede that there are many explanations
for the factiness of American law, and I am articulating but one
plausible story. And finally, I must largely leave to the side (for
now) the normative debate about the practice of using facts as
shields. Although I have previously expressed skepticism at the
modesty and neutrality behind judicial factfinding of this sort,27 the
goal of this Article is more descriptive and preliminary: to use a
comparative lens to unearth an explanation for the fact-heavy U.S.
judicial culture.
24. See Trowbridge, supra note 13.
25. E.g., Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 194 (2007) (“[A]ttacks against the judiciary emphasizing the
courts’ inappropriate use of powers and methods associated with the legislature seem to be
longstanding, steady, and generated by a wide spectrum of ideological and party interests....
[I]n recent years the specific ‘legislating from the bench’ critique appears to have increased
in salience and usage .... At the outset of the twenty-first century, the term holds a prominent
place in American political discourse.”).
26. See Court Role and Structure, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/court-role-and-structure [https://perma.cc/ME77-FP2P] (describing how federal district
and appellate courts view their primary function as applying law to facts).
27. See Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255,
1262-63 (2012).
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What should not be overlooked, however, are the stakes of these
observations. Retreating to facts-as-shields is a move that shapes
doctrine and has downstream consequences. If a constitutional rule
is built on a factual foundation, what happens when those facts
change? If a new record is built with different factual dimensions,
does the precedential power of the original decision erode? What
happens if the Court gets the facts wrong—and where are those
facts coming from? Answering these questions is largely a task for
another day. For now, the point is just to recognize that the impli-
cations of a charged political climate (like the one we inhabit now)
are quite significant and long-lasting. If judicial decisions them-
selves change and become more facty as a result of high-intensity
politics, then there is a cost to keeping judges “under fire,” and it is
a cost we should recognize.
This Article will track the three points outlined above: Part I will
explain two different traditions of judicial fact consumption; Part II
will look at two different cultures of criticizing judges; and Part III
will explore four high-profile U.S. Supreme Court decisions where
the opinions can be seen as factual shields used by the Justices after
periods of sustained and specific criticism.
I. TWO DIFFERENT HISTORIES OF JUDICIAL FACT CONSUMPTION
Fact-heavy judicial decisions are par for the course in the United
States.28 Consider the sort of questions posed by recent cases and
commonplace to any reader of the United States Reports: Is a
“partial-birth abortion” ever medically necessary?29 Do violent video
28. When I say “fact,” I mean claims that are theoretically falsifiable and accompanied by
nonlegal evidence. This is the working definition of fact I have used in prior work, although
I acknowledge it is not perfect. See Larsen, Constitutional Law, supra note 21, at 184-85
(“[M]y working definition of a ‘fact’ draws from two common characteristics that lead most of
us to label certain statements factual ones when we encounter them. First, factual claims are
ones that can theoretically be falsified—meaning they can be tested as true or false ‘with a
degree of detached certainty.’ And second, factual claims are typically followed by evidence.
By this I mean that ‘a factual assertion is often followed by “look it up” (or, more likely,
“Google it”), whereas a normative assertion or a proffered legal interpretation is not.’”
(citations omitted)).
29. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165-66 (2007) (evaluating Congress’s finding
that the procedure is never medically necessary).
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games harm child brain development?30 Does money corrupt
politics?31 How common are instances of in-person voter fraud?32
General observations about the world like these (so-called “legisla-
tive facts”) hold significant influence on the way U.S. courts
construct and apply legal rules today, particularly constitutional
ones.33
As I have explored in prior work, American judges are fluent in
a language of facts—they write narratives that are heavily steeped
in generalized factual observations; they increasingly consume ami-
cus briefs and other sources of information to learn about the factual
nature of their decisions; and they often anchor their legal ratio-
nales in facty claims.34 There are, of course, many historical reasons
for this turn, including, as described below, the rise of legal realism
in the United States.35 But it is neither inevitable nor universal that
judicial decisions are fattened up with factual authorities and full
of generalized claims about the way the world works. One only need
30. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799-801 (2011) (assessing
California’s evidence from research psychologists purporting to show that violent video games
cause harm to minors).
31. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (discussing whether there is
enough evidence of corruption to justify limiting “independent expenditures” in political cam-
paigns).
32. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 201-02 (2008) (evaluating a
challenge to a voter ID law by asking how many votes were burdened and how rampant was
the problem of in-person voter fraud).
33. Do not be fooled by its name. A “legislative fact” need not be found by a legislature.
Larsen, supra note 27, at 1256; Kenji Yoshino, Appellate Deference in the Age of Facts, 58 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 251, 254 (2016). Legislative facts are generalized observations about the way
the world works as opposed to a specific “whodunit” fact about any particular controversy.
Larsen, supra note 27, at 1255-57; Yoshino, supra, at 254.
For a very comprehensive treatment of this observation and an excellent tour of the way
constitutional law depends on factual claims, see generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITU-
TIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008). For other scholars who
have contemplated implications from this observation, see generally Caitlin E. Borgmann,
Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1185
(2013); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding,
61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011); Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial
Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1988); Timothy Zick, Constitutional
Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115 (2003).
34. This is an observation I have made often in prior work. See, e.g., Larsen, Consti-
tutional Law, supra note 21; Allison Orr Larsen, Do Laws Have a Constitutional Shelf Life?,
94 TEX. L. REV. 59 (2015) [hereinafter Larsen, Constitutional Shelf Life]; Larsen, Amicus
Facts, supra note 21.
35. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
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look across the Atlantic Ocean to our cousins in the United Kingdom
for a useful comparator.
In 2016, when British courts considered Parliament’s role after
the “Brexit” vote to leave the European Union, it was described as
“a constitutional crisis of epic proportions.”36 An American observer
likely expected the resulting judicial decision to include a long factu-
al narrative perhaps exploring the economic consequences of the
vote or the realities of the immigration concerns that at least
partially motivated it.37 What they found instead was a long, dry
opinion with numbered paragraphs and a lengthy discussion of
precedent, completely insistent that the court was only answering
“a pure question of law.”38
36. Will Gore, By Branding High Court Judges ‘Enemies of the People,’ the Pro-Brexit
Media Proved It’s Finally Lost Touch with Reality, INDEP. (Nov. 4, 2016, 12:30 PM), https://
www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-daily-mail-pro-brexit-newspapers-tabloids-enemies-of-
the-people-high-court-ruling-lost-touch-a7397251.html [https://perma.cc/J33Y-Q3TP]
(complaining of hysteria); see Anne Perkins, High Court Brexit Ruling: What Does It All
Mean?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2016, 12:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/
03/high-court-brexit-ruling-what-does-it-all-mean [https://perma.cc/33X9-LLGZ] (attributing
to Parliament the talk of “a constitutional crisis”); see also Sarah Mackie, Brexit and the
Trouble with an Uncodified Constitution: R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the
European Union, 42 VT. L. REV. 297, 299 (2017) (“The crisis led to a case which has been
described as ‘the most important constitutional case for a generation,’ during which the
nature of the constitution, the division of power between the Crown and Parliament, and the
very nature of sources of rights and obligations were argued, echoing debates which have
taken place in Britain for centuries.”).
37. See John Curtice, The Vote to Leave the EU: Litmus Test or Lightning Rod?, 34 BRIT.
SOC. ATTITUDES 1, 2-4, 9-10 (2017), http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39149/bsa34_brexit_
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF2Q-CLFL].
38. This quote comes from the opinion issued by the intermediary court in November
2016. R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC (Admin)
2678, ¶¶ 1-5 (Eng.). Similar language can also be found in the Supreme Court opinion affirm-
ing this decision in January 2017. R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European
Union [2017] UKSC 5, ¶¶ 3-4 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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This is emblematic of British courts deciding such claims.39 As one
helpful commentator explains:
To be blunt about it, for most of its history the British judiciary
has tended to maintain “the law-is-the-law approach” to legal
language. On this model of decision-making, the job of the judi-
ciary is conceived of as positivistic and machine-like: judges are
supposed to find out what the law is (eschewing any inquiry in-
to what it ought to be) by consulting the “plain meaning” of
statutory words and common law precedents.40
Facty court opinions, in other words, are quite foreign to U.K. court-
watchers. There is no judicial wading through neuroscience jour-
nals to explore the effect violent video games have on juvenile brain
development, for instance.41 It would be unseemly and altogether
weird for a British judge to pronounce authority on such non-
judicial matters.
Take, for example, the U.K. decision known as Animal Defenders,
an analog to Citizens United in the United States.42 The Animal
Defenders case was a challenge to a ban on political advertising in
the United Kingdom; challengers claimed that it unduly infringed
a freedom of expression protected by the U.K. Human Rights Act of
1998 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.43
39. To be sure, “constitutional law” and “judicial review” in the United Kingdom and the
United States mean very different things—thanks in no small part to the tradition of parlia-
mentary supremacy that has held firm in England (although that may have changed in the
past twenty years). See Delaney, supra note 19, at 544-47. But claims that look a lot like
American constitutional claims are often presented to U.K. courts under the “Human Rights
Act of 1998,” and it is to those decisions that I refer. See id. at 557-61. I limit my discussion,
in other words, to cases written after the recent “constitutional renaissance” in the United
Kingdom had begun. See id. at 544. For others who have seen these two forms of judicial
interpretation as similar, see Burton Atkins, Interventions and Power in Judicial Hierarchies:
Appellate Courts in England and the United States, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 71, 74 (1990); Louis
E. Wolcher, A Philosophical Investigation into Methods of Constitutional Interpretation in the
United States and the United Kingdom, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 241 (2006); see also
PAUL CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 610-19 (8th ed. 2016) (explaining judicial review under the
Human Rights Act).
40. See Wolcher, supra note 39, at 283 (footnote omitted).
41. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 850-53 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
42. R (Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport
[2008] UKHL 15, [2008] 1 AC 1312 (appeal taken from Eng.).
43. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 4.
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The House of Lords opinion deals primarily with precedent (citing
many prior cases) and includes one paragraph answering whether
there is a “pressing social need” for the law in this case.44 In con-
cluding that there was and upholding the law, Lord Bingham
resolved—without citation—that “it is highly desirable that the
playing field of debate should be so far as practicable level.”45 That
is it. No citation to an amicus brief. No mention of the record. No
string cite referencing the available data they had on the question.
No factual narrative at all.
The jurists who wrote separately in Animal Defenders took more
of a foray into what we would call legislative facts. One talked about
“an elephant in the committee room”—that is, “the dominance of
advertising, not only in elections but also in the formation of polit-
ical opinion, in the United States.”46 She worried that “we do not
want our government or its policies to be decided by the highest
spenders,” and she referred to a book by Bruce Ackerman and Ian
Ayres for the proposition that “[e]normous sums” are spent on
politics in America and that “there is no limit to the amount that
pressure groups can spend on getting their message across in the
most powerful and pervasive media available.”47 But even that
generalized factual point was softened as she returned to the spe-
cifics of this particular case, to conclude “that the ban as it operates
in this case is not incompatible with the appellants’ Convention
rights. It is a balanced and proportionate response to the problem.”48
Full stop. Conclusion reached.
Compare that approach to the one taken by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Citizens United. The same arguments about the effect of
money on politics were pressed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the
Justices responded with what Michael McConnell has called a
“quasi-empirical” opinion.49 As described more below, Justice
Kennedy used language in Citizens United about the “scant evi-
dence” on the “record” (in this case and prior ones) that independent
44. Id. at ¶ 30; see, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 6-7, 23, 32-33, 53.
45. Id. at ¶ 28.
46. Id. at ¶ 47 (opinion of the Baroness Hale of Richmond).
47. Id. at ¶¶ 47-48.
48. Id. at ¶ 51.
49. Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123
YALE L.J. 412, 446 (2013).
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expenditures do in fact cause political corruption.50 Pamela Karlan
observed that “[t]hose statements ... are phrased as statements of
fact” even if in reality they express normative commitments.51
Indeed, it was these facty claims that led a Montana court to as-
sume that a different result was justified when litigation produced
a new factual record, an assumption that was rebuffed when the
Supreme Court summarily reversed the Montana court.52
To be sure, this is not a perfect comparison because (as I have
noted) the nature of judicial review in the United States has histori-
cally been quite different from such review in the United Kingdom.53
But, nonetheless, we can learn something by pausing to consider
why facty judicial opinions are unremarkable in American constitu-
tional law, but almost nonexistent to perhaps our closest legal
cousin across the pond. The two countries share a common-law
tradition where analogizing and distinguishing cases are the name
of the game—both heavily fact-intensive modes of reasoning. Given
this similarity, one might expect the two cultures of judicial
decision-making to closely resemble each other. Why do judicial
opinions in these cousin countries look so dramatically different
from one another?
For one thing, as others have documented, the rise of legal
realism in the United States, which was far less influential in the
United Kingdom, makes legislative facts more relevant to Amer-
ican constitutional decisions.54 At the risk of oversimplifying a
50. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360-61 (2010); see also McConnell, supra note
49, at 446 (“[I]t was not necessary for the Justices ... [in Citizens United to make] dubious
quasi-empirical inquiries relating to the prevention of corruption, the protection of stock-
holders, or leveling the playing field.”).
51. Karlan, supra note 23, at 1281; see also id. at 1279 (noting that Citizens United rests
on claims that are “simultaneously strongly empirical and deeply normative”); Pamela S.
Karlan, Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35 (2012) (“Citizens United reflected
a philosophical, rather than an empirical, position on money’s effect on politics.”).
52. W. Tradition v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 6 (Mont. 2011) (“Citizens United was
decided under its facts or lack of facts.”), rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition P’Ship v. Bullock, 567
U.S. 516 (2012) (per curiam).
53. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Wolcher, supra note 39, at 245 (“[I]t
is often said, albeit with some overstatement, that in the United States the Constitution is
what the Supreme Court says it is, but in Britain the Constitution is what Parliament says
it is.”).
54. See Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 111, 115 (1988); Zick, supra note 33, at 129 (“For realists, then, data and social
experience, not concepts, were to be the foundation for objective judicial decisionmaking.”).
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complicated and varied school of thought, legal realists do not be-
lieve that judging is the mechanical application of legal principles
to a set of facts.55 Born largely as a reaction to the formalism that
dominated legal thought in the late 19th century and early 20th
century, American “[r]ealists frankly recognize[ ] the courts’ law-
making function.”56 At bottom, realists believe “(1) in interesting
cases, reasonable people can frequently come out either way and
(2) in such situations, policy considerations are relevant even if not
dispositive.”57
The influence of realism on American legal thought cannot be
overstated. Put simply, “American lawyers, to one degree or an-
other, all subscribe to the notion that in many litigated cases—
especially those that get to the Courts of Appeals and form the
foundation of our casebooks—traditional legal materials (i.e.,
statutes and case law) rarely suffice to determine the outcome.”58 In
other words, Americans believe that in hard cases sometimes law
just “runs out” and the ensuing gap is not filled by logical deduction
(as the British believe) but rather by policy considerations propelled
by claims of legislative fact.59
This “[l]egacy of American [l]egal [r]ealism” separates American
courts “from the prevailing view in the United Kingdom and the rest
of the world.”60 It also helps to explain why judges in the United
States anchor constitutional law decisions in facts, but judges in the
United Kingdom do not. Edward Rock has made this observation
explicitly in the context of comparative corporate law:
In a Realist system, where one is taught that indeterminacy is
pervasive and that, in the interesting cases, policy consider-
55. Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005)
(giving an overview of the theoretical approaches to American legal realism). Examples of
leading scholars in American legal realism include Karl Llewellyn, Underhill Moore, Walter
Wheeler Cook, Max Radin, Brian Leiter, and more. Id. at 51. The father of American legal
realism is said to be none other than Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Id.
56. Woolhandler, supra note 54, at 115 & n.36 (citing W. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER,
JURISPRUDENCE 434-83 (1987)); see also Zick, supra note 33, at 129-30.
57. Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Doctrine and the Legacy of American Legal Realism,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 2019, 2029 (2015).
58. Id. at 2021.
59. Id. at 2023.
60. Id. at 2020, 2023.
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ations are paramount, it is entirely natural and appropriate to
state the policy issue explicitly and then to resolve it as best one
can. In a traditional, doctrinalist system that operates on the
assumption that nearly all cases can be resolved by a careful
analysis of precedent and that the judge, even in resolving gaps,
is very much a delegated decisionmaker (an agent not just of the
legislature but also of the arc of precedent), it is entirely natural
and appropriate to build policy arguments from within the case
law.61
Thus, one answer to my “how did we get here” question about
American facty court opinions must be linked to the significant
impact of realism on American legal thought. As soon as one ac-
knowledges that, at times, courts make law (rather than just dis-
cover it), legislative facts become increasingly important.62 “After
all,” as Professor Ann Woolhandler explained, “it only makes sense
to provide courts with data to assist in their lawmaking function if
one sees courts as having such a function, as distinguished from a
function of discovering law that is dictated by text, precedent, and
principle.”63
Factiness, therefore, is at least partially a byproduct of American
legal realism. Of course, this need not be an alternative story to the
one I am telling; it could instead be a complementary one. Consider
the following explanation for fact-heavy opinions in the United
States: judges everywhere seek a “shield,” by which I mean they
want to make their decisions seem inevitable and not dependent on
personal subjective discretion. In the United Kingdom, where legal-
ism still holds and there is a tradition of seeing judges as “finding”
law and not “making it,” that shield takes the form of numbered
paragraphs reciting precedent that make the present decision seem
like “nothing new to see here.” In the United States where realism
reigns, by contrast, the shield takes the form of a reference to facts
61. Id. at 2049.
62. See Woolhandler, supra note 54, at 115.
63. Id. As a corollary observation, Professor Woolhandler also notes that the Realist era
spawned “the instrumental view of law ... that a good legal rule is one that causes a desirable
social end.” Id. This, too, encourages legislative factfinding. For “[i]n an age of pragmatic
balancing, one would ask for a change in a legal rule by showing empirically that the rule will
not advance the end it was supposed to ... and that another rule better advances social ends.”
Id. at 116.
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and a narrative that places the decision as the logical conclusion
that flows from the way the world works on the ground. In either
place, the shield is doing defensive work; its form is just determined
by the legalism/realism divide between the two countries. But the
shields are very different from one another and perhaps they are
responding to different sorts of threats. We thus need further
explanation.
II. JUDGES “UNDER FIRE”—A FURTHER COMPARISON
The need for judges to defend themselves through doctrine is am-
plified under certain circumstances. Once again a comparative per-
spective sheds light on an answer as to when and how. Judges in the
United States and judges in the United Kingdom have quite
different relationships with politics. Traditionally, appointment to
the bench in the United Kingdom was done through “‘secret sound-
ings’ [where] unnamed judges and senior bar members” privately
consulted with the Lord Chancellor, and a selection was made
through “taps on the shoulder.”64 Under this system it mattered a
great deal where the candidate went to school, for example, and in
what circles he or she (mostly he) ran.65 The entire process was very
much behind the scenes, quite distant from the public sort of
confirmation hearing that is common in the United States.66
In recent years, the United Kingdom has overhauled its judicial
appointment process in an effort to make it more transparent and
less reliant on an “old boys network.”67 But what has not changed is
a strong desire to isolate judicial appointments from the political
process.68 It is no secret that one reason for the British insistence to
64. Mary L. Clark, Advice and Consent vs. Silence and Dissent? The Contrasting Roles of
the Legislature in U.S. and U.K. Judicial Appointments, 71 LA. L. REV. 451, 473 (2011).
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Brett Kavanaugh Is Patient Zero, ATLANTIC (Oct. 1,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/kavanaughs-partisanship-threat-
ens-supreme-court/571702/ [https://perma.cc/4G5V-7PVU].
67. See Judith L. Maute, English Reforms to Judicial Selection: Comparative Lessons for
American States?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 387, 389-90, 395 (2007).
68. Clark, supra note 64, at 470 (despite the strong commitment to parliamentary
supremacy, in the United Kingdom “[n]either historically nor currently has there been a
formal role for Parliament in judicial appointments”); Why US Top Court Is So Much More
Political than UK’s, BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
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keep judicial appointments out of Parliament is the desire to avoid
the circus of the U.S. judicial confirmation process.69 As one British
commentator puts it, “[T]he single biggest factor militating against
parliamentary involvement in the judicial appointment process is
revulsion at the spectacle-like nature of U.S. Supreme Court
confirmation hearings.”70 U.S. Senate confirmation hearings, she
says, leave the British with “a shiver of horror running through the
system that we should have anything like that.”71
It is more than just a spectacle they wish to avoid though; the
British put a premium on keeping their judges out of politics al-
together.72 Unlike American Justices who hold almost celebrity
status at least within the legal community (think the Notorious
RBG and the Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer book tours), judges
who sit on the high court in England are basically anonymous.73
These judges are far from celebrities, and the British like it that
way.74
45632035 [https://perma.cc/N5MT-3ULB] (“[Changes to judicial appointments in the United
Kingdom were not] ‘very controversial at all. There was no discussion of it in the press when
the names were announced and when we looked at the people who were there it was all
understandable,’ said Alison Young, Prof[essor] of Public Law at the University of Cam-
bridge.”).
69. Clark, supra note 64, at 485.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. T. T. Arvind & Lindsay Stirton, Legal Ideology, Legal Doctrine and the UK’s Top
Judges, PUB. L., July 2016, at 418, 435 (“The UK has been fortunate in that the upper tiers
of the judiciary have during the course of the twentieth century evolved institutional
strategies that have had the effect of mitigating the impact of the overtly political aspects of
the issues with which they must deal. The result is valuable and worth preserving—a highest
court that is neither as politicised nor as systematically influenced by political ideologies as
the US Supreme Court is commonly said to be.”); Wolcher, supra note 39, at 284 (“To
illustrate this difference in attitude, contrast the recent widespread obsession of the American
media and the U.S. Senate with the political and moral values of President Bush’s Supreme
Court nominees with the following rather droll statement from the Consultation Papers of the
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005: ‘It is essential that our systems do all that they can to
minimize the danger that judges’ decisions could be perceived to be politically motivated.’”).
73. Colin McIntyre et al., Supreme Courts: The US and UK Compared, J. L. SOC’Y SCOT.
(Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/60-2/1018891.aspx [https://perma.cc/
JL85-XM3W] (“The US Supreme Court tends to enjoy a higher domestic profile than does the
UK Supreme Court.”).
74. Adam Taylor, Why America’s Supreme Court Drama Looks So Strange to the Rest of
the World, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/10/06/why-
americas-supreme-court-drama-looks-so-strange-rest-world/ [https://perma.cc/Y62W-LWRZ]
(“[I]n Britain, ... appointments to the Supreme Court receive scant attention in mainstream
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Indeed, as noted above, even criticism of U.K. judicial decisions
is very much considered to be out of bounds. This is true, not only
with older decisions before the “constitutional renaissance” and the
rise in prominence of judges in the United Kingdom, but also in
even more recent decisions that have a more constitutional flavor
than their older counterparts.75
When newspapers criticized the Brexit judicial decision in 2016
and accused the judges of taking the vote away from the people, it
prompted a swift counterreaction.76 Criticizing judges in the news-
papers, according to leading lawyers, “encouraged readers to believe
that the judges were somehow expressing personal political prefer-
ences,” an accusation that is “deeply shocking.”77 A former Lord
Chancellor put it simply—“[J]udges ‘do not do politics. They do
law.’”78 Interestingly, he elaborated on this sentiment by making an
unflattering comparison to Americans: “Our judges ... are selected
to be judges on their legal ability. Their political allegiance is
irrelevant and plays no part in their selection—which is not, for
example, the case in the US.”79
media. Nominees are far from household names.”).
75. Delaney, supra note 19, at 544; see also Kate Malleson, Judicial Reform: The
Emergence of the Third Branch of Government, in REINVENTING BRITAIN: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE UNDER NEW LABOUR 133, 134 (Andrew McDonald ed., 2007) (“The courts have thus
been drawn into politically sensitive areas previously beyond their scope, as a result of which
the judiciary now plays a more central role in the British constitution. This new judicial role
in mediating and adjudicating the boundaries of the constitution is still developing, but it is
clear that the effect of this trend will be to reshape the relationship between the judiciary and
the other branches of government.”).
76. Compare Iain Duncan Smith, Why It’s Crucial that the Judges Who Could Decide the
Fate of Brexit ARE Scrutinised, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 6, 2016, 8:25 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.
uk/debate/article-4007894/IAIN-DUNCAN-SMITH-s-crucial-judges-decide-fate-Brexit-
scrutinised.html [https://perma.cc/69PL-FV64], with Clement-Davies, supra note 5, at 279-81.
77. Clement-Davies, supra note 5, at 280.
78. Id. (quoting Lord Chancellor Charles Falconer); see also Kate Malleson, The Evolving
Role of the UK Supreme Court, PUB. L., Oct 2011, at 754, 769 (“I like to think that the selec-
tion of our judges and in particular the senior judiciary is now as immune from the political
process as it is possible to be in a democratic society.”).
79. Charles Falconer, The Vicious Assault on UK Judges by the Brexit Press is a Threat
to Democracy, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/
nov/04/assault-uk-judges-brexit-press-judiciary-constitution [https://perma.cc/HDS9-4HKV];
see also Why US Top Court Is So Much More Political than UK’s, supra note 68 (discussing
the controversy around the Kavanaugh confirmation hearing, and how “[t]he debate is unlike
any the UK has when justices at the Supreme Court are replaced, as a different appointment
system means their political views are rarely publicly known and, according to experts, do not
have any influence in the process”).
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The shock at the prospect of mixing judging and politics—or even
the impropriety of implying that a judicial decision was politically
motivated—must seem unusual to an American legal audience. For
in the United States, of course, judges are quite often subjected to
this sort of critique.80 The rallying cry that judges must not “legis-
late from the bench” is a favorite particularly (but not exclusively)
in conservative circles.81 And newspaper accounts routinely begin
any report on a federal judicial decision by first identifying the judge
with the political affiliation of the president who appointed her.82
Slinging mud at judges in the United States is not new, but it has
recently escalated to a fever pitch—particularly at the Supreme
Court level. Following the controversial confirmation of Justice
Brett Kavanuagh last year and the prior decision not to give a
hearing to Merrick Garland, President Barack Obama’s nominee to
an earlier vacancy, it did not take long for commentators to link the
partisan divisions surrounding the appointment to legitimacy prob-
lems for the Court as a whole.83 The theme is that there is no longer
daylight between the political nature of judicial appointments and
the quasi-political nature of the decisions they make while judges.84
In the words of one journalist for the Atlantic:
If Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts is truly concerned
about preserving the Court’s legitimacy in American life ... Brett
Kavanaugh has become his worst nightmare.... With such a
partisan route as his pathway, a Justice Kavanaugh would
arrive at the Supreme Court as a patient zero, carrying a virus
of illegitimacy to its decisions.85
80. See, e.g., Opinion, A Threat to Fair Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2009), https://www.
nytimes.com/2009/09/08/opinion.08tue1.html [https://perma.cc/4Z8E-V8PP]; Editorial, Wrong
Way on Campaign Cash, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 11, 2009), https://www.stltoday.com/
opinion/editorial/wrong-way-on-campaign-cash-our-view-u-s-supreme/article_db0fdb60-35b4-
5f5f-a6e9-dc6daf194838.html [https://perma.cc/H33K-VTTZ].
81. Catherine Cook, Legislating from the Bench, HARV. POL. REV. (Mar. 3, 2009), https://
harvardpolitics.com/online/legislating-from-the-bench/ [https://perma.cc/PJ7T-Z2MV].
82. See, e.g., Christopher Mele, Judge Who Blocked Trump’s Refugee Order Praised for
‘Firm Moral Compass,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/
judge-trump-refugee-order-ann-donnelly.html [https://perma.cc/9CZP-HE2H] (identifying
Judge Donnelly as being appointed by President Obama).
83. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 66.
84. See id.
85. Id.
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Indeed, court-packing plans are being discussed in mainstream
politics now, and a Pew Research Report reveals “that negative
views of the court are at a 30-year high, driven in part by a wide-
spread perception that the justices are unable to set aside their
political views when making decisions.”86 The position that “judges
do law, not politics” is almost laughable in the United States right
now.87
All of this criticism has triggered concerns that the Court needs
to look for an internal solution. Former Attorney General Eric
Holder explained that “[w]ith the confirmation of Kavanaugh and
the process which led to it, (and the treatment of Merrick Garland),
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court can justifiably be questioned.
The Court must now prove—through its work—that it is worthy of
the nation’s trust.”88 Henry Gass echoes this sentiment: “If Roberts
and his colleagues are going to restore the court’s reputation as a
trusted, nonpartisan counterweight in the federal government, the
justices will have to take matters in their own hands.”89
Enter the facty shield.
III. FACTS AS SHIELDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR DOCTRINE
Consider carefully those words quoted above about the U.S.
Supreme Court’s current legitimacy crisis: “The Court must now
prove—through its work—that it is worthy of the nation’s trust,”90
and they “have to take matters in their own hands.”91 The idea of
course is that the judicial outputs—the decisions themselves—must
86. Henry Gass, John Roberts’s Mission Impossible for the Supreme Court, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/1116/John-Roberts-s-
mission-impossible-for-the-Supreme-Court [https://perma.cc/4SFH-Z3HX]; Negative Views of
Supreme Court at Record High, Driven by Republican Dissatisfaction, PEW RES. CTR. (July 29,
2015), https://www.people-press.org/2015/07/29/negative-views-of-supreme-court-at-record-
high-driven-by-republican-dissatisfaction/ [https://perma.cc/MS4D-APTB]; see Supreme Court,
GALLUP (2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx [https://perma.cc/AR82-
ZZR4].
87. This is of course a descriptive claim of generalized sentiment; it is not a claim I
personally endorse.
88. Eric Holder (@EricHolder), TWITTER (Oct. 6, 2018, 1:10 PM), https://twitter.com/Eric
Holder/status/1048666766677876738 [https://perma.cc/XTP5-6ADC].
89. Gass, supra note 86.
90. Holder, supra note 88.
91. Gass, supra note 86.
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undo the damage caused by partisan politics; the Court must do
something internally to earn back its reputation externally.
Interestingly, this is very different from the response by the legal
culture in the United Kingdom. In the debate about criticizing
judges in the United Kingdom, the fear is that the judges might do
just this—they might take matters into their own hands and some-
how change their decisions.92 To Britons, internal judicial response
to criticism seems improper or undesirable.93 In the United States,
altering decisions is seen as the way to salvage judicial legitimacy.
In any event, the influence of criticism on judicial decisions may
be inevitable. Judges are, after all, only human; and humans who
pride themselves on independence and neutrality are likely sen-
sitive to being called out in the newspapers for decisions they make
that are politically motivated.94 Under these circumstances it seems
only natural to reach for a rationale that protects against such
reproach.
Rhetorically, retreating to facts in the face of confrontation is a
classic move. Americans have always equated science with legiti-
macy.95 It is quite possible that resting judicial decisions on data
and empirical explanations is a tempting shield for judges to use in
a world where commentators scrutinize and politicize every word
one writes in an opinion. In the words of David Faigman, a leading
scholar on the Court’s use of facts in judicial doctrine, facts and
“[s]cience posses[s] the mien of neutrality, rather than the stink of
judicial activism.”96 One explanation, therefore, for the rise of
92. Patrick O’Brien, “Enemies of the People”: Judges, the Media, and the Mythic Lord
Chancellor, PUB. L., Nov. Supp. 2017, at 135, 143 (“The reason that criticism is so destructive
is because judges are human and will want to respond.”).
93. See id. at 142. For a similar argument see Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s
Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240, 2245-46, 2254-72 (2019) (arguing that it is
likely not legally legitimate for a Justice to switch her vote to protect the Court’s sociological
legitimacy).
94. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 125 (2006) (explaining how the
Federalist Society serves as “an attentive audience” to conservative judges “that applauds
certain kinds of decisions and doctrines”). See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
95. Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 111,
116, 151 (1997) (“By reciting scientific facts, the Court shows why its rulings are in harmony
with a culture that accords legitimacy to findings made by scientists.”).
96. FAIGMAN, supra note 33, at 155.
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legislative facts in American judicial opinions is as a reaction to
accusations of political behavior by the courts. U.S. courts are
“under fire” more often than their British counterparts and because
they are under a different kind of public scrutiny (i.e., accusations
of political behavior), they benefit from a different kind of shield.
Facty opinions offer shelter. It is easier, for example, to vote that
Congress was using outdated facts to justify the Voting Rights Act
than it is to vote that Congress did not have the power to pass the
law.97 It seems more modest, even if in reality it is not. And, con-
versely, in a country such as the United Kingdom in which judges
are already largely shielded from politics, there is less of an urge to
reach for the factual authorities to make one look more objective
and neutral. Below are four examples that I think illustrate the
retreat to facts in judicial doctrine in the United States.
A. Citizens United v. FEC
In 2009, all eyes were on the Supreme Court as it evaluated the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (commonly known as the McCain-
Feingold Act).98 The law, which among other things restricted inde-
pendent campaign expenditures by corporations and unions, was
challenged as a violation of the First Amendment.99 The Justices
had already heard the case argued once in the 2008-2009 Term and
ordered reargument in the 2009-2010 Term, expanding the list of
questions presented.100
Perhaps because the reargument highlighted the stakes of the im-
pending decision, the Justices were “under fire” in the press to a
significant degree in the months leading up to the Citizens United
decision in 2010. Commentators cried that “[t]he Supreme Court
[was] about to radically change politics,”101 and was poised to do so
97. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556 (2013). For my thoughts on this case—and
a debunking of the idea that it was a modest rationale—see Larsen, Constitutional Shelf Life,
supra note 34, at 98-101.
98. Seth Gitell, Making Sense of McCain-Feingold and Campaign-Finance Reform,
ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2003), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/07/making-
sense-of-mccain-feingold-and-campaign-finance-reform/302758/ [https://perma.cc/8Z62-456G].
99. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 321 (2010).
100. Id. at 310.
101. A Threat to Fair Elections, supra note 80; see also Peter Overby, Decade Brought
Change to Campaign Finance, NPR (Dec. 25, 2009, 12:40 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/
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in a political rather than judicial manner.102 Polls at the time in-
dicated that most Americans were concerned about the effect
corporate money had on politics.103 The writing was on the wall by
the fall of 2009; the Court was poised to make a big change to the
law of campaign finance regulation.104 In the words of one op-ed
writer for the Saint Louis Dispatch: 
It’s like using a debate over the infield fly rule as an excuse to
rewrite the baseball rulebook. It is a classic case of legislating
from the bench—this time from the court’s conservative jus-
tices. If the lower-court ruling in Citizens United were to be
overturned, it should end all whining from the right about the
scourge of “activist judges.”105
In January of 2010, the Court finally decided Citizens United.106
Finding conflict with the First Amendment, specifically its core
protection of political speech, the majority of the Court invalidated
federal law that prohibited a corporation or labor union from mak-
ing an “electioneering communication” or any expenditure advocat-
ing the election or defeat of a candidate at any time.107
story/story.php?storyId=121872329 [https://perma.cc/WE82-C5TZ] (“The way that the
Supreme Court has been interpreting campaign finance law could well lead us into a spiral
where we end up with a deregulated campaign finance system.” (quoting Rick Hasen)).
102. See Jeffrey Rosen, Opinion, The Trial of John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/opinion/13rosen.html [https://perma.cc/NR64-F5WQ] (“If,
however, in the Citizens United case, Justices Roberts and Samuel Alito now join Justices
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas in a 5-to-4 decision that broadly overturns longstanding bans
on corporate campaign expenditures, the 2007 Scalia critique will be vindicated. And liberals
will conclude that John Roberts is guilty of precisely the kind of strategic temporizing that
conservatives have long ascribed to Earl Warren.”).
103. Opinion, The Rights of Corporations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2009), https://www.
nytimes.com/2009/09/22/opinion/22tue1.html [https://perma.cc/88TK-3H8K].
104. See, e.g., Mary E. O’Leary, Campaign Finance Reform Law Faces Uncertain Future,
NEW HAVEN REG. (Dec. 13, 2009), https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/Campaign-finance-
reform-law-faces-uncertain-future-11638436.php [https://perma.cc/2VT7-9J5G] (“On the na-
tional level, the betting among high court watchers, is that the majority of justices will
overturn 100 years of legal precedent that reined in corporate and union campaign
spending.”).
105. Wrong Way on Campaign Cash, supra note 80.
106. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010).
107. Id. at 320-21, 365-66. The law defined “electioneering communication” as a broadcast
ad reaching over 50,000 people in the electorate within thirty days of a primary or sixty days
of a general election. Id. at 320-21.
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But, beneath the banner of the First Amendment, Citizens United
carried a very fact-heavy rationale. The Court held “that independ-
ent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”108 As Pamela
Karlan has explained, this rationale “sounds empirical .... Those
statements ... are phrased as statements of fact, or predictions.”109
The majority found there was “scant evidence that independent
expenditures” lead to political corruption,110 and it “cited an enor-
mous variety of nonlegal texts, many written by specialists, to
support their contentions about the purposes of campaign finance
regulation, the scope of campaign finance corruption, and corporate
power and rights.”111 The end result is an opinion that focuses on
what Michael McConnell has called “dubious quasi-empirical
inquiries relating to the prevention of corruption ... or leveling the
playing field.”112
The factual dimension of Citizens United had an interesting
epilogue. Not even a full year after the decision, litigants in Mon-
tana challenged an almost identical campaign finance restriction in
their state on the basis of a new and different factual record.113
Although the litigants eventually lost at the U.S. Supreme Court in
a summary reversal, they met success below because the Montana
Supreme Court explained that “Citizens United was a case decided
upon its facts” or lack of facts.114 To the Montana litigants and
Montana judges, Citizens United was such a facty decision that a
108. Id. at 357.
109. Karlan, supra note 23, at 1280-81; see also Gorod, supra note 33, at 28-29 (arguing
that the Citizens United Court repeatedly used facts not in the record below); Zephyr
Teachout, Facts in Exile: Corruption and Abstraction in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 295, 298, 301 (2011) (“[The Citizens United decision] lacked
both micro-facts and the mid-level, institutional facts, which provide a coherent narrative
about who does what to whom, and why.... In the re-argument, the Supreme Court did not
allow for a new development of the factual record below. Instead, it relied on a very sparse
record, one developed just for this case, and on facts from outside the record.”).
110. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
111. Karen Petroski, Texts Versus Testimony: Rethinking Legal Uses of Non-Legal Ex-
pertise, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 81, 99 (2013).
112. McConnell, supra note 49, at 446.
113. See W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 3-5 (Mont. 2011), rev’d sub nom.
Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam).
114. Id. at 5.
2020] JUDGING “UNDER FIRE” AND THE RETREAT TO FACTS 1109
different factual record could lead to a different result.115 In a quick
summary reversal, the U.S. Supreme Court set the record straight—
explaining “[t]here [could] be no serious doubt” that Citizens United
applied to the Montana law.116
Reasonable minds can debate whether the Supreme Court’s
holding in Citizens United, particularly its definition of “corrup-
tion,”117 is really a question of fact. Pamela Karlan argues that the
decision “reflect[s] a philosophical, rather than an empirical, posi-
tion on money’s effect on politics.”118 This seems particularly
persuasive in light of the Montana epilogue. But the point for now
is just to recognize that, whatever its true nature, the Court’s
rationale sounds “facty.” It drips in “quasi-empirical” claims and
assertions about the record. In the face of pointed criticism and
accusations of “judicial activism,” five Justices chose to retreat to
higher ground—a rationale packaged in factual language and
tethered to factual sources.
B. Roe v. Wade
It is not just modern conservative Justices who retreat to facts
when under pressure. Roe v. Wade is perhaps the most famous
example of a factual shield in the United States Reports.
Like Citizens United, Roe was argued twice.119 Chief Justice
Warren Burger had assigned the opinion in Roe to Justice Black-
mun.120 We now know from his papers that Blackmun began to
draft a short opinion about vagueness—the original version was
only seventeen pages long—but then in May 1972, asked for the
Court to order reargument.121 The case was reargued on October 11,
1972.122 Speculation was high that “something might be changing
in the court.”123 In her terrific book based on Blackmun’s private
115. See id.
116. Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491.
117. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351-60 (2010) (limiting the definition of cor-
ruption to be “quid pro quo”).
118. Karlan, supra note 51, at 35.
119. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973).
120. GREENHOUSE, supra note 22, at 82.
121. See id. at 87-89.
122. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
123. Abortion Pressures on Burger Court, NEWSDAY, July 5, 1972, at 4.
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papers, Linda Greenhouse recounts the tension in the air while the
case was pending.124 President Richard Nixon had issued a state-
ment against “abortion on demand,”125 and Justice Blackmun even
kept Gallup opinion polling data and news clips about abortion in
the case file.126 One picture Greenhouse paints leaves a telling im-
pression of Blackmun’s mental state while writing Roe. Upon being
assigned the opinion, Blackmun asked his wife and daughters for
their views on abortion at the dinner table.127 According to his
youngest daughter Susan, “Dad put down his fork mid-bite and
pushed down his chair, ‘I think I’ll go lie down ... I’m getting a
headache.’”128
Blackmun’s headache was well-deserved. In the American tra-
dition, the criticism the 1972 Justices faced while the decision was
pending was a familiar one: the allegation is that they were acting
as politicians and not as judges. In the words of the New York Times
in a 1972 article called “The Balanced Court ...” the message about
the stakes of Roe was clear: “The divisions among the justices over
fundamental issues will increasingly be interpreted as political
rather than constitutional disagreements.”129 Cries of judicial
activism were in the air that summer with the now-familiar rallying
call for “a judiciary which showed more ‘judicial restraint,’ which
would ‘interpret the laws, not make them.’”130 And—as no doubt
modern readers will find familiar—the high stakes of the Court’s
“legitimacy” were front and center.131
Certainly, the level of “anti-judge venom” in the press in the early
1970s was significantly less than it became in 2009 when everyone
124. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 22, at 72-101.
125. Id. at 83.
126. Id. at 91.
127. Id. at 83.
128. Id.
129. The Balanced Court ..., N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1972, at 22; see also id. (“The image ...
created will not be that of a balanced Court but of an indecisive one” due to “the impression
[of] political zeal.”).
130. John P. MacKenzie, Court ‘Activism’ Becomes Issue, WASH. POST, May 29, 1972, at
A27.
131. See The Balanced Court ..., supra note 129 (“This, too, creates the impression that po-
litical zeal of individual members of the Court may be getting in the way of judicial ties that
ought to bind the Court together even when there is sharp legal or ideological disagreement.
This will further reduce the Court’s authority in the eyes of the general public. The image
thus created will not be that of a balanced Court but of an indecisive one.”).
2020] JUDGING “UNDER FIRE” AND THE RETREAT TO FACTS 1111
was anticipating Citizens United (an interesting observation in and
of itself). But it is also true that the Justices who would decide if a
woman’s right to an abortion was constitutionally protected knew
that they were writing history and that their words would prompt
controversy.132 Blackmun himself wrote the following note to himself
after Conference: this is “not a happy assignment;” the Court “will
be excoriated.”133
As is well-known, Justice Blackmun visited the Mayo Clinic in
July 1972 while Roe was pending.134 There, he spent hours in the
library researching the history and medical risks of abortion: “In
longhand on a lined pad, he took careful notes, numbering each
factual assertion and marking the citation for each.”135 Of course,
the final opinion in Roe differed significantly from the short opinion
on vagueness that Blackmun had circulated earlier.136 Anchoring
the rationale in a fundamental right to privacy secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment, Roe relied on factual claims both about the
(old) history of the procedure, the (low) risks to the health of the
woman, and the (great) importance of legality to keeping abortion
safe.137 Blackmun’s personal notes reflect that his time researching
at the Mayo Clinic played a big part in these revisions and his
emerging “awareness” about the greater factual contours of the
controversy.138
I certainly do not mean to suggest that the scrutiny and alle-
gations of political behavior lobbed at the Court in 1972 (perhaps
the source of Blackmun’s headache) were the only reasons Justice
Blackmun took the Roe opinion in a facty direction. But even taking
Blackmun at his word that his views were awakened by factual
132. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 22, at 93.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 90.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 95.
137. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-50, 163 (1973); see also GREENHOUSE, supra note 22,
at 90. For others who have noted the emphasis on facts in Roe, see Borgmann, supra note 33,
at 1196; Hashimoto, supra note 95, at 143-44.
138. GREENHOUSE, supra note 22, at 93 (“According to his notes, Blackmun said he was
‘pleased we deferred’ the cases from the previous term. His week at [the] Rochester [Mayo
Clinic] had given him ‘an awareness of medical history I have not had before.... I have a lot
of personal investment. I am revising and expanding the proposed opinions to command a
majority.’”).
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research, it is interesting to contemplate what made him go to the
Mayo Clinic to conduct that research in the first place. Given the
fact that Justice Blackmun was keenly aware of the eyes on him—
which we know from, among other things, the newspaper clippings
he kept in his file139—it seems at least possible that the Roe opinion
represents a retreat to facts when judging “under fire.”
Finally one other point bears mentioning in this regard. It is in-
teresting to observe, as Brianne Gorod has, that subsequent lower
courts dealing with abortion disputes have followed Roe’s trend of
emphasizing the factual contours of the abortion dispute.140 Surely
stare decisis plays a great role in that dynamic, but one has to
wonder if “the anti-judge venom” that continues to follow courts
considering abortion challenges today also plays some role in the
doctrine growing in the factual weeds.
C. Shelby County v. Holder
Although perhaps not as obvious as some other examples in this
Article, I would also add Shelby County v. Holder to the list of facty
opinions issued by the Supreme Court while the Justices were under
fire. Shelby County was the 2013 decision by the Court invalidating
a key part of the Voting Rights Act.141 It was largely briefed as a
case about congressional power (power to force certain states to get
approval before changing voting laws), but the Court held instead
that the law’s coverage formula—which determined if a state or
local government must obtain this permission—was outdated and
unconstitutional.142 In the words of the Chief Justice, who wrote the
139. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
140. Gorod, supra note 33, at 46-47.
141. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
142. Id. at 551-54, 557. I also concede, as I have done in the past, that there is room to
debate the exact nature of the constitutional violation in Shelby County. See Larsen,
Constitutional Shelf Life, supra note 34, at 109-10 (“There is room to argue about the precise
nature of the constitutional violation in Shelby County. The Court was certainly concerned
about federalism and the ‘principle of equal sovereignty among the States,’ but that alone did
not cause the statute to fall. The law’s disparate treatment of the states marked the high
stakes and the exceptional nature of the preclearance system, but it was not the ultimate
constitutional flaw in it. And although the Court was extensively briefed on the scope of
Congress’s power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the majority opinion did
not decide whether the Voting Rights Act was an appropriate use of Congress’s enforcement
power under those constitutional texts.” (citations omitted)).
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opinion for the Court, “[T]he Act imposes current burdens and must
be justified by current needs.”143 The Court explained that this part
of the law (which was written in 1965, revised in 1982, and reautho-
rized without change by Congress in 2006) was “based on decades-
old data,” “eradicated practices,” and needed to be “updated.”144
In reaching this result, Shelby County emphasized facts about
minority voter turnout and changes in those patterns since the pas-
sage of the Voting Rights Act.145 The opinion dissects the congress-
ional record on this score and includes charts and graphs to make
the factual point that times and racial voting patterns had
changed.146
As critics of the decision have noted, the Shelby County rationale
can largely be attributed to the majority’s views on questions of
fact regarding racial discrimination in voting: in the Court’s view
(but not Congress’s), “[v]oter turnout and registration rates
[between whites and racial minorities] now approach parity.”147
Indeed, Eric Berger claims Shelby County “hinged largely on [the
Court’s] understanding of the facts.”148 And, he adds, “The Court’s
presentation of these facts is absolutist, framed in simple, declara-
tive sentences as incontestable fact ineluctably leading to a consti-
tutional conclusion. Congress’s failure to update the coverage
143. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 536 (quoting Nw. Austin Util. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203
(2009)). For my lengthier discussion of the case’s rationale and its facty nature, see Larsen,
Constitutional Shelf Life, supra note 34, at 109-113.
144. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 536, 538-39, 551, 557.
145. See Gabriel J. Chin, Justifying a Revised Voting Rights Act: The Guarantee Clause and
the Problem of Minority Rule, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1551, 1560 (2014); Bertrall L. Ross II, The State
as Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial Distrust of the Legislative Record, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2027, 2061 (2014).
146. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 553-54; Ross II, supra note 145, at 2061 (discussing how
the Majority supported its holding “that current needs did not justify the burdens.... [by]
selectively emphasiz[ing] certain record evidence, second-guess[ing] other evidence, and
simply ignor[ing] other evidence”); Ian Vandewalker & Keith Gunnar Bentele, Vulnerability
in Numbers: Racial Composition of the Electorate, Voter Suppression, and the Voting Rights
Act, 18 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 99, 107 (2015) (“At its heart, Shelby County is an opinion about
levels of minority voter registration and turnout: they are mentioned repeatedly, almost to
the exclusion of any other measure of discrimination.”).
147. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 540.
148. Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667,
695 (2015); see also id. at 694 (“If the Court’s idiosyncratic factual understandings played a
substantial role in Citizens United and Graham, they almost single-handedly determined the
outcome in Shelby County v. Holder.”).
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formula, it emphasized, ‘leaves [the Court] ... with no choice but to
declare § 4(b) unconstitutional.’”149
There was another path—a less facty path—available to the
Court when it was deliberating Shelby County. Coming into the
case, the commentary and briefs emphasized questions of congres-
sional power.150 The Court did not choose this path. By invalidating
only the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act but not the pro-
vision authorizing the preclearance provision generally, the Court
left a big open question and created doctrinal confusion. As Franita
Tolson argues, by avoiding the big question in Shelby County “nei-
ther the Court nor the legal scholarship has a clear sense of the
scope of congressional authority over elections.”151
Why did the Court make this choice? Part of the answer for sure
must be the value in judicial modesty that comes with avoidance.
The Chief Justice, we know, particularly values such moves.152 By
invalidating the coverage formula alone and leaving the question of
congressional power for preclearance open, the Court kicked the ball
in Congress’s court leaving them the option to try again.153 But it is
also, I think, at least plausible that the Court—and Roberts in
particular—avoided the big question in Shelby County in order to
keep its head down, so to speak, in light of accusations of political
decision-making.
When Shelby County was pending, the criticism was pointed and
many warned that if the Court should strike down the Voting Rights
Act it would create “widespread” discrimination,154 “turn back the
149. Id. at 696 (quoting Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557).
150. See Jon Greenbaum et al., Shelby County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes
Irrational, 57 HOW. L.J. 811, 828-29, 838 (2014). For examples of these arguments pressed to
the Court, see Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Shelby
County, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (No. 12-96), 2012 WL 8678866, at *13-15; Brief for Justice and
Freedom Fund as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S.
529 (2013) (No. 12-96), 2013 WL 12355741, at *13-15.
151. Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 379, 382 (2014).
152. See Daniel Breen, Avoiding “Wild Blue Yonders”: The Prudentialism of Henry J.
Friendly and John Roberts, 52 S.D. L. REV. 73, 128-29 (2007).
153. Of course, as others have pointed out in an era of gridlocked Congress and in the face
of a 2006 reauthorization, this gesture of judicial modesty might be a hollow one. See Tolson,
supra note 151, at 381.
154. Editorial, Voting and Racial History, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2012), https://www.nytimes.
com/2012/01/27/opinion/voting-and-racial-history.html [https://perma.cc/9NRN-WYWZ].
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hands of time,”155 and allow “the Old South [to] rise again.”156 And,
of course, the dominant refrain was familiar (even if the arguments
were coming from the left instead of the right this time): the Court
was about to act politically and not judicially. On an episode of
NPR’s Tell Me More while the case was pending, one commentator
did not pull punches when anticipating Shelby County: “It’s not legal
and it shows exactly why we should defer to Congress to determine
that voting discrimination remains concentrated in covered states
as opposed to the court. They’re basing this on, you know, political
assumptions and judgments as opposed to law.”157
Indeed, after oral argument in the case, an opinion piece in the
New York Times focused on Chief Justice Roberts personally, ask-
ing:
Is it better to be black these days in Mississippi or in Massachu-
setts? Not being likely to find myself black in either state, I
wouldn’t presume to say, but Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
exhibited no such diffidence. Without having asked a single
question of Shelby County’s lawyer, Bert W. Rein, he taunted
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli with statistics purporting to
show that Mississippi has the better record of African-American
voter registration and turnout. It was a “gotcha” performance
beneath the dignity of a chief justice.158
Once again I do not claim to know the inner workings of the Chief
Justice on this issue (or any issue). He may not care what his critics
say. But I think there is enough circumstantial evidence to suggest
that for one who cares a lot about the Court’s legitimacy and image
155. Debbie Elliott, Alabama Divided as Court Prepares to Hear Voting Rights Challenge,
NPR (Feb. 21, 2013), https://www.npr.org/2013/02/25/172603328/alabama-divided-as-court-
prepares-to-hear-voting-rights-challenge [https://perma.cc/3D8K-RB2J]. 
156. Id.
157. Weighing the Future of the Voting Rights Act, NPR (Mar. 1, 2013, 12:00 PM), https://
www.npr.org/2013/03/01/173244624/weighing-the-future-of-the-voting-rights-act [https://
perma.cc/S6P9-ZZHV]; see also Linda Greenhouse, ‘A Big New Power,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6,
2013, 9:00 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/a-big-new-power [https://
perma.cc/R2AW-EG2H] (“On what basis, they will wonder, did five conservative justices,
professed believers in judicial restraint, reach out to grab the authority that the framers of
the post-Civil War 14th and 15th Amendments had vested in Congress nearly a century and
a half earlier ‘to enforce, by appropriate legislation’ the right to equal protection and the right
to vote.”).
158. Greenhouse, supra note 157.
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as a nonpolitical institution, the allure of a presumably factual
decision on the Voting Rights Act rather than a bold legal call about
the scope of congressional power may have been too great to resist.
Ultimately, the decision reached in Shelby County could be ex-
plained in charts and graphs about voter turnout. It could be laid
out objectively and in a way that sounds scientific and data driven.
There was no need to answer doctrinal puzzles about standards of
review or enter normative debates about the scope of congressional
power or even to constitutionally interpret what the words “appro-
priate legislation” mean in the Fifteenth Amendment.159 Instead, by
focusing on factual changes and the outdated nature of the coverage
formula, the Court sought to “insulate[ ] it[self] from criticisms that
it was unfairly biased against the Voting Rights Act or minority
voters.”160 This “just the facts, ma’am” strategy is attractive because
it appears judicially modest even if the modesty is only an illusion.
D. Brown v. Board of Education
Finally, my short list of landmark Supreme Court opinions where
the Justices turn to facts would not be complete without a nod to-
wards Brown v. Board of Education. Forests have been felled with
commentary and analysis of this historic decision, and I will not at-
tempt to expand significantly on them here. It is sufficient to point
out that when thinking about facts as shields, it is hard not to
recognize the famous (or infamous) footnote eleven in Brown.161
In footnote eleven, of course, the Brown Court relied on social
science data produced by Kenneth Clark (and put in the record what
is now called the “doll study”)162 to support the claim that “[s]egre-
gation ... has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental
development of negro children.”163 This claim was controversial from
the beginning, both as a matter of methodological soundness and
legal relevance.164
159. U.S. CONST. amend XV.
160. Berger, supra note 148, at 705.
161. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
162. Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and
the Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 802 n.33 (2002).
163. Brown, 374 U.S. at 494 (citation omitted).
164. Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence (American Survey), 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 164-65
2020] JUDGING “UNDER FIRE” AND THE RETREAT TO FACTS 1117
Why did the Court add the citation to the doll study? There seems
to be somewhat of a scholarly consensus that the sources were not
necessary to the outcome in Brown.165 And some claim that the ad-
dition of the evidence actually detracted from the power of the
Court’s opinion.166 In a well-known article published in 1955 (the
year after Brown), Edmond Cahn raised the alarm that the “flimsy”
social science evidence relied on in Brown might falsely indicate (in
a bad way) “that the outcome, either entirely or in major part, was
caused by the testimony and opinions of the scientists.”167
Perhaps the easiest explanation for the inclusion of footnote
eleven is that the Justices—acutely aware that the country’s eyes
were upon them—reached for a factual shield. Caitlin Borgmann
has made this suggestion.168 In her article on the use of what she
calls “social facts” in civil rights cases, Borgmann argues that at
least part of the reason the Justices reached for the data in Brown
was to provide “neutral-sounding cover for Justices acutely aware
of wading into a contentious social debate.”169
And they certainly were “wading into a contentious social de-
bate.”170 In a Newsweek article written while Brown was pending,
ominously entitled An Impending Crisis, one journalist wrote about
“the hot poker” being “tendered to the high court,” complete with
vast political ramifications.171 Others were not so polite. In the
newspaper for the University of Georgia, gubernatorial candidate
(1955); Ernest van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases—A Reply
to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REV. 69, 74-75 (1961); Mark G. Yudof, School
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165. Borgmann, supra note 33, at 1196-97 (“In both [the Brown and Roe] decisions, the
social science ‘evidence’ likely did not influence the establishment of constitutional doctrine.”);
see also Hashimoto, supra note 95, at 139-40.
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citation of social science in invalidating racial segregation could set a precedent in equal pro-
tection cases that ‘complaining parties [must offer] competent proof that they would sustain
or had sustained some permanent (psychological or other kind of) damage’” (citing Cahn,
supra note 164, at 168)).
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Herman Talmadge said in 1950 he would not “allow it” if the
Justices made the wrong choice on segregation.172 What was to
become massive resistance to Brown in the South was no surprise;
it was fully advertised by southern politicians as soon as the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.173
As historians have explained, the Justices in Brown were keenly
aware of the gravity of the moment.174 Moreover, they were being
accused of making up law, and these were men that shuddered at
such an accusation.175 It is at least possible, I suspect, that in such
a political cauldron—where editorials were issued regularly labeling
the Justices as just masked politicians176—once again the allure of
factiness proved rather tempting.
CONCLUSION
The theme of this symposium is judging in “politically charged
moments.” Maybe other contributors to this discussion are right
that there should be nothing different about judging in hot moments
as opposed to judging in cold moments.177 Or maybe every moment
is hot depending on one’s perspective.178 As a descriptive matter,
however, I think it is hard to deny the consequences that come from
judging in a country where judicial criticism is a sport. It only takes
172. Gordon Walters & Grady Griner, Two Sides of the Coin, RED & BLACK (June 22, 1950),
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a quick comparison with a sister country to see the distinct norms
at work,179 and the consequences those norms produce.180
As judges are labeled politicians they will defend themselves
“through [their] work” in an attempt to demonstrate that they are
not.181 The end result produces judicial decisions fat with factual
claims and factual authorities;182 it leads to judicial rationales that
appear neutral because they are only fact-based and it potentially
masks other dynamics at work. Our current political climate—and
particularly our disdain for “so-called judge[s]”183—thus gives us
even more to worry about. The long-term consequences of anti-
judicial venom may outlast today’s headlines and worrisome tweets;
the doctrinal aftereffects of the retreat to facts could last for ages to
come.
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Confirmation, HILL (Oct. 8, 2018, 8:03 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/
410356-holder-supreme-courts-legitimacy-can-be-questioned-after-kavanaugh [https://perma.
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183. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM), https://
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